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1 Introduction
Can higher minimum wages ensure that economic development benefits the poorest without
hindering growth? The question is controversial in both academic and policy circles. The
recent riots in Bangladesh and Cambodia show that the social demand for a more equal
distribution of the benefits of growth is high in developing countries. In China, polls reveal
that concerns about inequality have grown as “roughly eight-in-ten have the view that the
rich just get richer while the poor get poorer” (Pewresearch Center, 2012). The debate is
also heated in developed economies: renowned politicians and economists have called for a
significant rise in minimum wages in the U.S. (Woellert, 2014), as has Barack Obama in
his 2014 State of the Union address. On the other hand, any attempt by authorities to
increase minimum wages is opposed by employer federations, who argue that higher wages
will erode their margins, forcing them to fire workers or entirely relocate their activities
to countries with lower wages. The American Chamber of Commerce states, for example,
on its Philippine website that “the relentless upward adjustment in the minimum wages in
the Philippines has made minimum wages in the Philippines among the highest minimum
wages in ASEAN and caused great harm to the country’s domestic and export manufacturing
sectors”.1 These two opposing views mirror the lack of consensus among academics on the
effects of minimum wages for firms and workers (see Dube et al., 2010; Allegretto et al., 2011
Neumark et al., 2013, for example).
In this paper we use balance-sheet data from over 160,000 industrial firms to analyze both
the firm- and aggregate-level effects of higher minimum wages in China, where the minimum
wage is set at the city-level. Our empirical strategy exploits the 2004 reform of minimum
wages that imposed large but heterogeneous increases in minimum wages across Chinese
cities. We combine a triple-difference approach with instrumental-variable techniques. We
show that the 2004 reform was binding: the share of Chinese firms complying with the local
minimum wage or paying wages just above the minimum level drastically increased after the
reform, while no such trend was found pre-2004. Moreover, we find that higher minimum
wages reduced the survival probability of local firms between 2003 and 2005. However, in
1http://www.amchamphilippines.com/2013/10/24/jfc-statement-on-minimum-wage-increase/.
the surviving firms wages rose without any effect on employment. The main explanation for
this finding is that firms improved significantly their productivity following the cost shock,
allowing them to absorb the shock without affecting employment or profitability. We show
that these results are not consistent with competing explanations. In particular, we do
not detect any substitution of less-paid/less protected migrants for incumbent workers. At
the aggregate level (our data covering 70% and 90% of overall industrial employment and
production respectively), our results suggest that the overall effect of firm-level adjustments
in city-level industrial employment is zero, with entries canceling out exits. Moreover, higher
minimum wages increase aggregate productivity growth thanks to productivity improvements
among incumbent firms and the net entry of more productive firms. Hence, in a fast-
growing economy like China there is a cleansing effect of labor market standards. Minimum
wage growth allows more productive firms to replace the least productive firms, and forces
incumbent firms to become more competitive. These two mechanisms boost the economy’s
aggregate efficiency. The effects we measure are economically large. Minimum wage growth
between 2003 and 2005 explains on average 20% of firm- and city-level productivity gains in
China over the period under consideration.
China is a relevant case to analyze for a number of reasons. First, China, the fastest-
growing economy over the past fifteen years, has become a key player in the global economy;
as such, understanding the determinants of its competitiveness and industrial dynamics is
of interest for both developed and developing countries. Moreover, China is a showcase in
terms of low wages: in 2004, average monthly wages in manufacturing were 141 Dollars in
China, versus 342 Dollars in Mexico and over 2,500 Dollars in the US.2
Second, as shown in Figures A-1 to A-3 in the Appendix, there is considerable variation
in both the level and growth-rate of the minimum wage in the 261 Chinese cities in our
final sample.3 In 2003, the minimum wage ranged from 170 Yuan (20 Dollars) in Eerduosi
and Hulunbeier (Inner Mongolia) to 600 Yuan (72 Dollars) in Shenzhen; on the other hand,
between 2003 and 2005, it rose by up to 147% (also in Eerduosi and Hulunbeier), while re-
2Authors’ calculations based on LABORSTA ILO data: http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP/guest.
3China is divided into 4 municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing) and 27 provinces which
are further divided into prefectures. As is common in the literature, we use the terms city and prefecture
interchangeably, even though prefectures include both an urban and a rural component.
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maining constant in some other cities which in 2003 already satisfied the new wage standards
introduced in the 2004 reform.
Third, the 2004 reform is of interest as it followed a top-down logic. The express aim of
this reform was to increase workers’ wages and bring about convergence between localities in
terms of the minimum wage: after 2004, city-level minimum wages had to fall within a range
of 40-60% of the local average wage. This rule imposed unprecedented rises in the minimum
wage, in particular in localities where they were initially the lowest. Chinese minimum wages
consequently increased drastically over a short period of time (the average annual growth
rate of city-level minimum wages was 14% between 2004 and 2007, versus 7% between 2000
and 2003), while the dispersion of minimum wages across localities narrowed significantly
(the coefficient of variation of city-level minimum wages fell by 25% between 2003 and 2007).
We exploit this quasi-natural experimental feature of the reform to carry out IV estimations
of the firm- and aggregate-level effects of minimum wages.
We carry out our analysis by identifying two groups of firms based on their exposure to the
2004 minimum-wage reform. Exposed firms are defined as those for which average wages prior
to the reform were lower than the subsequent local minimum wage (as in Harrison and Scorse,
2010, and Draca et al., 2011). We then compare the performance of exposed and non-exposed
firms, controlling for firm-level initial characteristics (size, productivity, export, ownership
etc.) and for city-sector fixed effects. This allows us to account for any potential correlation
between minimum-wage growth and local business cycles, and firm and sector characteristics.
We focus on the pre- and immediately post-reform period to exploit the large and widely-
varying rise in city-level minimum wages induced by the policy. This estimation strategy is
close to a triple difference, and amounts to comparing the difference in performance growth
between exposed and non-exposed firms in cities where the minimum wage grew sharply to
that in cities where it grew more slowly. However, minimum wages may rise faster in cities
where the economic situation of low-wage firms is more favorable. To address this remaining
endogeneity issue, we propose an IV strategy based on the institutional features of the 2004
reform; more specifically, we use the initial level of the minimum wage and the predicted
minimum-wage growth based on the “40% rule” that minimum wages be at least 40% of
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average wages to estimate the causal effect of minimum wages on firm-level outcomes.4 We
follow a similar instrumentation strategy to analyze the effect of minimum wages on the
various margins of city-level employment and productivity growth.
Our work here contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it adds to the
debate on the effect of minimum wages on employment. Although raising the wage floor
should theoretically increase the wages of low-paid workers and adversely affect employment
(Borjas, 2004), recent evidence (largely from the US) points to little or no employment
effects of minimum wages (Card and Krueger, 1994; Dickens et al., 1999; Dube et al., 2010;
see Schmitt, 2013, for a review).5 However, the question remains controversial (see Dube
et al., 2010; Allegretto et al., 2011 Neumark et al., 2013, for example). We here revisit
this question using data from Chinese factories, which are often considered as a symbol of
“low-cost” production. There is already some work on China in this respect; this has relied
on aggregated or semi-aggregated data and has produced mixed results.6 We differ from this
existing work by the use of much more detailed data, so that we can directly link firm-level
outcomes to changes in the local minimum wage. The work closest to ours is the firm-level
analysis of Huang et al. (2014) on local minimum wages and employment. Our work differs
in three important respects. We focus on the 2004 reform, which provides us with an original
instrument to address the endogeneity problems that are typical in this area, we consider
non-employment outcomes such as firm-level productivity and profitability, and we analyze
the aggregate consequences of minimum wages for employment and productivity.
4The greater the difference between 0.4 times the city-level average wage in 2005 and the city-level
minimum wage in 2003, the larger the increase in the local minimum wage should be.
5One of the potential explanations for the lack of an employment effect is that the percentage of workers
earning the minimum wage in the countries in question is very small, i.e. under 5% (Neumark et al., 2004),
and that the changes in the minimum wage have been only small (often lower than the inflation rate). The
situation in China is radically different. Since the promulgation of the new minimum wage regulations in
2004, local governments have been required to implement frequent and substantial increases in minimum
wages. The latest illustration is the pledge under China’s 12th Five-Year Plan to raise minimum wages by at
least 20% annually, and more than double them by 2015. Such substantial upward adjustments in minimum
wages can be expected to have sizable repercussions on firms and workers.
6Ni et al. (2011) find some negative effects on overall employment in the prosperous coastal provinces
and some positive effects in the less-developed interior provinces. Wang and Gunderson (2011) focus on the
employment to population ratio for migrants and find the opposite result (a negative effect in non-coastal
zones and no effect in the fast growing Eastern regions). These contradictory results in provincial-level
data are confirmed by Fang and Lin (2013), who combine county-level minimum-wage panel data with a
longitudinal household survey. Our work differs in that we use balance-sheet data from industrial firms to
consider non-employment outcomes. We also focus on the 2004 reform, which provides us with an original
instrument to address the endogeneity problems.
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Our second contribution is that our analysis of non-employment outcomes allows us to ask
why minimum wages have such small firm- and aggregate-level employment effects. Firms
can adapt to higher minimum wages in a number of different ways. Some examples are lower
labor turnover or profits, greater firm efficiency or small price increases, all of which could
limit employment losses (Schmitt, 2013; Hirsch et al., 2011). However, rigorous empirical
evidence on such effects is scarce (with the notable exception of Draca et al., 2011, who show
that British firms absorbed the shock of the introduction of a national minimum wage in
1999 by reducing their profit margins).7 In this paper, we propose a careful evaluation of
the various ways in which Chinese firms may have adjusted to the 2004 reform, including
survival, number of employees, productivity and profitability.
Third, we provide an in-depth analysis of the effect of minimum wages on the various
margins of city-level productivity growth. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper
to investigate how firm-level adjustments to minimum wages help shape aggregate outcomes.
By doing so, we contribute to the analysis of the determinants of aggregate efficiency in
developing countries. Both firm-level inefficiency and the misallocation of resources across
firms have been proposed as explanations of the lower aggregate TFP in developing countries
(Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). Regarding the first channel, a number of recent papers have shown
that there is a fixed cost of adopting better practices/technologies (Bloom et al., 2013; Duflo
et al., 2011).8 With respect to the second channel, Khandelwal et al. (2013) argue that
institutions might play a role in this (mis)allocation of resources.9 We here argue that labor
standards might also determine resource allocation and aggregate efficiency. Ineed, the lower
the wages, the smaller the absolute difference in per-unit marginal cost resulting from “high”
and “low” production/management technologies. In some developing countries, low wages
7However, Draca et al. (2011) do not find firm-level adjustments in terms of productivity.
8Bloom et al. (2013) use a randomized experiment to show that adopting better management practices
significantly increases firm-level productivity in Indian textile firms. The experiment suggests that informa-
tional barriers, as well as procrastination, prevent firms from adopting the best management practices. Duflo
et al. (2011) also use a randomized experiment to show that Kenyan farmers do not always use fertilizers
even though it is profitable to do so; however, they do adopt them when their delivery (but not the fertilizers
themselves) is provided for free immediately following the harvest. This is consistent with a model where
agents are present-biased and have a fixed utility cost of fertilizer adoption.
9They show that under the Multi Fibre Arrangement, the allocation of export licenses to Chinese textile
exporters resulted in serious misallocation, less-productive firms receiving more export licenses than did
more-productive firms.
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might thus provide incumbent firms with only little incentive to adopt more efficient, but
also more costly, technologies or management practices; they may also allow some inefficient
firms to survive. Along these lines, we show that increasing minimum wages in a fast-growing
economy like China improves aggregate efficiency due to higher productivity among surviving
firms and the net entry of more productive firms. However, higher minimum wages do not
seem to favor the reallocation of market shares towards initially more productive incumbent
firms.
Finally, we also contribute to the literature on the role of labor laws and labor standards
in improving the situation of low-paid workers in developing countries. Harrison and Scorse
(2010) find that anti-sweatshop activism increased wages without hurting employment in
the Indonesian footwear and textile industries, while higher minimum wages tended to re-
duce employment. We here focus on minimum wages but extend our analysis to the entire
manufacturing sector.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the
Chinese minimum-wage system, and the theoretical effects of higher minimum wages on
firm- and aggregate-level outcomes. Section 3 then presents the data and some descriptive
statistics, while Section 4 sets out our empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the firm-level
results, and Section 6 provides an analysis of the effects of minimum wages on aggregate
employment and productivity. Last, Section 7 concludes.
2 Minimum wages in China and their potential effect
on firm- and aggregate-level outcomes
We first describe how minimum wages are set in China and the main features of the 2004
reform. To guide our empirical analysis, we then discuss the various theoretical effects of
minimum wages on firm- and aggregate-level outcomes.
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2.1 Characteristics of the 2004 minimum-wage reform
Minimum wages were first introduced in China in 1993 following the country’s ratification
of the International Labor Organization Convention No. 26. However, the 1993 rules did
not really cover migrants, and the penalties in the case of non-enforcement were only low.
As such, minimum wages in the 1990s did not really bind in China.
In March 2004, the Rules for Minimum Wages (2004 Rules) took effect. These extended
minimum-wage coverage to migrant workers, and penalties in the case of non-enforcement
were dramatically increased. One of the explicit aims of the reform was to increase living
standards. As different Chinese regions have very different living standards, China does
not have one national minimum wage; minimum wages are rather established following a
decision process involving both national and local authorities. Each province, municipality,
autonomous region, and even district sets its own minimum wage according to both local
conditions and national guidelines.10 Typically, following the national requirements, provin-
cial governments set out multiple minimum-wage classes for the region as a whole, and each
city and county within the region chooses the appropriate minimum-wage level based on its
own local economic conditions and living standards. For example, in the latest round of min-
imum wage increases, Zhejiang set out four minimum-wage classes for the entire province,
with some top-tier cities such as Hangzhou, Ningbo and Wenzhou choosing the highest min-
imum wage (Class A), while other cities, including Jiaxin, Jinhua and Taizhou settled on
the next-highest minimum wage (Class B).
The fact that municipalities can adjust the minimum wage to local economic conditions
(the distribution of wages, evolution of living costs and prices, and level of economic develop-
ment and changes in employment) ensures spatial variation in the level of minimum wages
but also gives rise to an endogeneity problem, making it difficult to establish the causal effect
of higher minimum wages; however, the existence of national guidelines is useful here since
it allows us to develop instruments to address this potential endogeneity. Crucially for our
analysis, the 2004 Rules expressly encourage minimum-wage convergence across localities,
10The definition of minimum wage may also vary across locations. Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shanxi and
Henan do not include social security payment and housing public funds when calculating minimum wage
while other provinces do. In unreported results, which are available upon request, we check that our main
message holds when excluding those locations.
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yielding unprecedentedly large rises in the minimum wage where they were initially partic-
ularly low. As a guideline, the 2004 Rules state that the local minimum wage for full-time
employees should fall within a range of 40-60% of the monthly local average wage.11 This
range is quite similar to what we observe in a number of developed countries. In 2011,
the French monthly minimum wage was around 1,100 Euros, with the average wage being
roughly double that amount at 2,100 Euros,12 while in the US these figures were 1,250 and
3,600 Dollars respectively.13
As Section 4 shows, we will exploit these national guidelines as instruments for local
minimum wages in our empirical strategy.
2.2 The theoretical effects of higher minimum wages
Higher minimum wages represent a cost shock for firms (potentially both in terms of the
fixed and marginal costs of production). This shock can have a variety of effects on firms,
depending on the theoretical framework we have in mind.
In a perfectly-competitive environment where the marginal productivity of labor is de-
creasing and wages equal the marginal productivity of labor, higher minimum wages should
reduce the number of workers that firms employ. Moreover, some firms may no longer be
able to sell enough to cover their fixed production costs, and will thus shut down.
The predictions are similar in a model where heterogeneous firms in terms of productivity
compete monopolistically with constant markups. Firms will pass all of the higher marginal
cost on to higher consumer prices. Overall demand will fall and the least-productive firms
will be forced to exit the market, as they will no longer be able to cover their fixed production
costs.
These firm-level adjustments should generate unemployment, as the labor demand curve
is negatively-sloped and wages do not adjust downwards. With heterogeneous workers,
stronger layoff effects are expected for workers with lower skills and/or productivity. How-
11See the decree available at http://www.molss.gov.cn/gb/ywzn/2006-02/15/content_106799.htm.
12See http://www.insee.fr/fr/bases-de-donnees/bsweb/serie.asp?idbank=000879878 and http:
//www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=NATTEF04155.
13See http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/AWI.html and poverty.ucdavis.edu/faq/
what-are-annual-earnings-full-time-minimum-wage-worker.
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ever, a number of mechanisms may mitigate these negative employment effects from higher
minimum wages.
Under efficiency wages, higher minimum wages can increase labor productivity by moti-
vating employees to work harder, allowing firms to absorb the cost shock. In addition, when
workers decide to participate in the labor market, and choose their employer as a function of
their outside option, higher minimum wages may not necessarily reduce employment due to
greater labor-market participation or less worker turnover within firms. Also, under imper-
fect competition with variable markups, firms can partially absorb any cost shock via lower
profit margins. Draca et al. (2011) focus on the minimum wage in the UK and find results
consistent with this latter hypothesis.
Last, higher minimum wages may also yield firm-level efficiency gains. Assume that
firms have to choose between two production processes: a high-tech process with low cons-
tant marginal labor requirements but a high fixed adoption cost, and a low-tech process with
high marginal labor requirements but no adoption cost. Higher minimum wages widen the
marginal-cost gap between the high- and low-tech technologies. As such, keeping quantities
constant, the opportunity cost of adopting the high-tech process falls. Consequently, firms
which previously preferred the low-tech process may switch to paying the fixed cost required
for the high-tech process. Low wages here act as a disincentive for the adoption of more
efficient production techniques.
This brief discussion has underlined that higher minimum wages can affect a number
of firm-level outcomes: survival, employment, productivity and profitability. Depending
on the framework we have in mind, the mechanisms may act in opposite directions, so
that the impact of higher minimum wages on aggregate employment and productivity is a
priori ambiguous. The aim of this paper is mainly empirical, and we do not explicitly test
theoretical frameworks against each other. However, by considering a variety of firm-level
outcomes, we are able to discuss the possible ways in which Chinese firms have adjusted to
the 2004 minimum-wage reform and how these affected aggregate productivity.
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3 Data and summary statistics
Before discussing our estimation strategy, we here briefly present the data we use and their
descriptive statistics.
3.1 Data
Our main data source is the annual surveys conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics
(NBS) in China. Those firm-level surveys include balance-sheet data for all industrial state-
owned and non-state firms with sales above 5 million Yuan. The industries here include
mining, manufacturing and public utilities. A comparison to the 2004 full census of industrial
firms reveals that these firms (accounting for 20% of all industrial firms) employ roughly 70%
of the industrial workforce and generate 90% of output and 98% of exports (Brandt et al.,
2012).14 We use information on the number of employees, production, capital, intermediate
inputs and wages.15 We use data from the surveys for all years from 1998 to 2007. However,
as our paper focuses on the evolution of firm- and city-level performance between 2003 and
2005, our main sample comprises these two years (our main results hold when restricting the
period to 2003-2004 or when enlarging it to 2003-2006).
The data on minimum wages at the prefecture level come from various official websites
such as China Labour Net.16 The data contain monthly minimum wages for full-time em-
ployees and hourly minimum wages for part-time employees by city and year.17 Since we do
not have information on the total number of hours worked, we include only the former in
our regressions.
The macroeconomic indicators at the city-level such as GDP, population, FDI, unem-
ployment and university-student enrollment, which are used as controls in the aggregate
regressions, are taken from China Data Online18, provided by the University of Michigan.
14We follow the routine developed by Brandt et al. (2012) to link firms over time using a unique numerical
identifier.
15These data aggregate almost perfectly to the totals for the same set of variables reported in the Chinese
Statistical Yearbook.
16This website (http://www.labournet.com.cn/) was set up by the Ministry of Labour and provides infor-
mation on national labour and personnel rules.
17City-level minimum wage might be adjusted several times in a given year. We define the city-level
minimum wage in a year as the highest value the minimum wage takes in that year in the city.
18http://chinadataonline.org/
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3.2 Firm-level indicators and summary statistics
All the information we have is at the firm or city level; we do not have information at the
worker level. To compute firm-level average wages, we thus divide the firm’s total wage bill
by the number of employees.
While labor productivity is our main productivity measure throughout the paper, we
also calculate a firm-level TFP index. To do so, we estimate Cobb-Douglas production
functions at the 2-digit industry level following the approach developed by Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003). Intermediate inputs are used as a proxy for unobserved variables (entrepreneur
characteristics or macroeconomic shocks) which could determine the level of both inputs and
output.19
We clean the data by excluding observations for which value-added, capital or wages is
missing, negative or zero, and drop firms with fewer than 5 employees as reported average
wages may not be reliable for these firms. In order to avoid measurement issues in the
aggregate analysis, we also restrict our attention to localities with at least 20 firms in 2003
and 2005, and for which information on GDP, employment, FDI and so on is available. This
leaves us with a sample of 261 cities.
Our final sample contains 167,327 firms active in 2003, of which 21.5% had average wages
below the local minimum wage enforced in 2005. As is usual in the few papers considering
the effects of minimum wages with firm-level data (Harrison and Scorse, 2010; Draca et
al., 2011), we define this group as “exposed”, as they are certainly the most affected by
the minimum-wage rise. We discuss below the implications for our estimations of defining
treatment in this way.
Table A-1 in the Appendix presents statistics on the survival rates and change in the
average wage separately for exposed and non-exposed firms. The proportion of firms present
in 2003 which survived until 2005 is much lower for exposed firms (66%) than for non-
exposed firms (78%). Furthermore, wages rose significantly faster between 2003 and 2005
for the low-wage exposed firms. Over this period, the growth rate of firm-level average
19The results, available upon request, provide credible elasticities. The coefficient on labor is on average
lower than that usually found in the literature, but this is not surprising for a developing country such as
China where worker productivity is quite low.
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wages was 92 log points in this latter group, but only 13 log points in the group of firms with
higher initial average wages. The gap is similar for the evolution of the median firm-level
average wage within each group. These simple descriptive statistics suggest that there is a
negative correlation between “exposure” to the 2004 minimum-wage reform and survival, and
a positive correlation between “exposure” and the growth-rate of firm-level average wages
over the period. Our econometric analysis will then try to assess whether these correlations
can be interpreted as causal. By way of contrast, note that the average growth rate of the
minimum wage over this period is roughly the same for exposed and non-exposed firms; this
suggests that there is no systematic difference in the geographic distribution of exposed and
non-exposed firms in our sample.
Table A-2 in the Appendix continues the descriptive analysis by regressing the “exposed”
dummy on firm-level characteristics and city-sector fixed effects. Firms with average wages
below the subsequent minimum level report (quite intuitively) lower productivity. They
are also less likely to be foreign firms and exporters. The correlation with employment is
sensitive to the way in which productivity is computed: in column (1), where we use the
value of output per employee, employment enters negatively, while in column (2), with the
Levinsohn-Petrin approach, the coefficient on employment is positive. The State-ownership
dummy is not significant, which could reflect two opposing features which cancel each other
out: on the one hand, State-owned firms are more likely to respect minimum-wage laws, and
hence pay higher wages than the other firms; on the other hand, they can afford to pay lower
wages while remaining attractive to workers since they provide non-pecuniary benefits (such
as job security). Finally, all else equal (controlling for size and productivity, in particular),
exposed firms are more profitable, which might directly result from their lower wages. All of
these results are robust to the exclusion of outliers defined as the top and bottom percentile
of firms in terms of 2003 average wages (in column (3)).
To sum up, the firms the most exposed to minimum-wage growth between 2003 and
2005 are more likely to be Chinese domestic firms with low productivity. However, given
their productivity and size, these firms tend to be more profitable, this latter feature being
consistent with their lower wages.
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4 Empirical strategy
This section shows that the 2004 Chinese minimum-wage reform yields a nice quasi-natural
experiment to estimate the effect of minimum wages on firm- and aggregate-level outcomes.
We then discuss in detail our estimation strategy.
4.1 The 2004 reform as an experiment to assess the economic
effects of minimum wages
Most work on the effect of minimum wage has to deal with two main issues. First, it can
be difficult to estimate the effects of minimum wages on firm-level outcomes if the change
in the minimum wage is only small, or take place across the country at different but quite
similar points in time (when minimum wages are set locally). In this latter case, the cross-
section distribution of minimum wages remains on average stable over time, yielding only
short time-spans in which to estimate any effect (Meer and West, 2013). This is actually
often the case in the US and the UK.
Another issue, more particular to developing countries, is the extent to which minimum
wages are enforced. Massive non-compliance makes it difficult to identify minimum wage
effects (see for example Strobl and Walsh, 2003, for the case of Trinidad and Tobago).
The 2004 Chinese reform has a number of advantages with respect to these two issues.
First, the reform imposed a massive rise in city-level minimum wages. As shown in Figure 1,
city-level minimum wages increased over all of the 2000-07 period, with a clear acceleration
from 2004 onwards. While the average annual growth rate in city-level minimum wages was
6.9% between 2000 and 2003, it was 15.5% between 2003 and 2007. The other remarkable
feature of post-2004 minimum wages is their convergence across cities. The right-hand panel
of Figure 1 shows that the dispersion of city-level minimum wages was stable pre-2004,
with a coefficient of variation of 0.23. However, post-reform the coefficient of variation fell
sharply to 0.2 in 2005, and 0.17 in 2007. This suggests that the fast city-level minimum
wage growth we observe from 2004 onwards is concentrated in cities with lower pre-reform
minimum wages; this outcome conforms to the convergence objective which was explicitly
pursued by national authorities with the 2004 minimum-wage reform. This feature will be
13
particularly useful for our instrumentation strategy.
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
M
on
th
ly 
m
ini
m
um
 w
ag
e
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
.1
6
.1
8
.2
.2
2
.2
4
co
ef
fic
ien
t o
f v
ar
iat
ion
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
Average minimum wage Coefficient of variation
(in Yuan) of city-level minimum wages
Figure 1: The change in city-level minimum wages
We might wonder whether these nominal rises in minimum wages are in reality cancelled
out by inflation, so that finally there is only little wage pressure on firms. We do not have
city-level price indices, and so use provincial price indices to calculate city-level real minimum
wages. Figure 2 shows that the movements in city-level real minimum wages are very similar
to the nominal movements in Figure 1. City-level real minimum wages rose on average by
6.5% per annum before the 2004 reform and by 12.1% post-reform, this post-reform growth
being again concentrated in cities with lower initial real minimum wages. In the econometric
analysis, we use real minimum-wage information.20
City-level minimum wages may have only little effect for two reasons: a lack of enforce-
ment, or the minimum wage not really binding (if firm-level wages are rising faster than the
minimum wage, for example). Neither enforcement nor the degree to which minimum wage
binds are observable. However, we do have some information suggesting that firms became
more constrained by minimum wage rules following the reform.
First, the 2004 reform aimed to increase firm-level compliance by strengthening controls
and reinforcing non-compliance penalties. Prior to 2004, average wages were at least equal
20In unreported results, which are available upon request, we check that our main message holds when
using nominal-wage information.
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Figure 2: The change in city-level real minimum wages
to the local city-level minimum wage in roughly 88.5% of active firms. This figure rose to
93.2% after 2004, suggesting that the Chinese minimum-wage reform was accompanied at
the local level by greater enforcement.21
In addition, Figure 3 shows a growing concentration of firm-level average wages around
the level of the city-level minimum wage post-2004. The top part of this figure depicts the
distribution of firm-level wages (left panel) and the ratio of firm-level wages to the city-level
minimum wage (right panel) in 2003 and 2005. The bottom part of the figure shows the
analogous distributions for 2001 and 2003. Firm-level wages rose markedly between 2003
and 2005, with the 2005 wage distribution shifting right from that pre-2004. However, this
shift is not uniform across the distribution. The top-right panel of Figure 3 shows that in
2005 fewer firms declared average wages below the local minimum level, as compared to
2003. On the contrary, more firms now declare average wages that are equal to or slightly
above the local minimum wage. This concentration of the distribution of firm average wages
around the city-level minimum wage does not seem to result from a time trend, since no
such pattern is seen between 2001 and 2003 (in the bottom-right panel). Table A-3 in the
21Our data include the total wage bill and the number of workers, but not the number of hours worked. Our
measure of firm-level average wages is sensitive to the presence of part-time workers in the firm. However, as
long as part-time intensity remains constant over time, the change in the share of firms with average wages
below the city-level minimum wage can be interpreted as a change in the way minimum wages are enforced.
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Appendix additionally shows that the share of firms whose average wage is below the city-
level minimum wage, and that whose average wage is at 15% above, fell slightly between
2001 and 2003 (from 12.4% to 10.3% and from 5.2% to 4.5%, respectively).
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Figure 3: The distribution of firm-level average wages pre and post the 2004 reform
The picture is different for the 2003-2005 period: the share of non-complying firms drops
sharply (from 10.3% to 6.3%) while that of firms with average wages just over the city-level
minimum wage rises (from 4.5% to 5.7%). These movements are qualitatively similar across
firm types (foreign, State-owned and domestic private firms).
The 2004 reform thus produced unprecedented changes in the minimum wage, both in
nominal and real terms. Moreover, these changes seem to be binding: the share of complying
firms rose sharply, as did the share of firms with average wages that are equal to or only
slightly higher than the minimum wage.
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4.2 Empirical specification and instrumentation
We provide both micro (firm-level) and aggregate (city-level) analyses of the effect of real
minimum wages on economic performance. We here present in detail the estimation strategy
for the firm-level analysis: that for city-level outcomes is very similar. From now on, we will
use the expressions “real minimum wage” and “minimum wage” interchangeably.
Whatever the country under consideration, assessing the effect of minimum wages on
firm-level performance brings up serious endogeneity issues. In particular, the authorities
may fix the minimum wage so as to match existing trends in firm performance, in particular
in terms of employment. The common view is that minimum wage rises will be larger when
the local economic context is favorable, so as to minimize any potential adverse effect on
firms. We would then find upward-bias in the estimated employment impact of the minimum
wage. This concern is particularly apt in China, where municipalities can officially adapt
the minimum wage to local economic conditions.
We here focus on the 2003-05 period since this is centered on the year of the Chinese
minimum-wage reform; however, our results are robust to the choice of alternative time
windows.22 We define “exposed firms” as those for which average wages in 2003 were below
the local minimum wage in 2005. These firms are obliged to raise wages in order to comply
with the new city-level minimum wage. Note that we do have no information on worker-level
wages. Our measure of reform “exposure” is thus potentially noisy: in reality, some fraction
of employees will not be exposed to the reform in so-called “exposed” firms and vice versa
for “non-exposed” firms. However, this is the best way to define exposure with firm-level
data; this is also the logic of the estimation proposed by Harrison and Scorse (2010) and
Draca et al. (2011) in their empirical analyses of Indonesian and British data, respectively,
and represents an improvement over aggregate analysis.23
We compare the change in firm-level performance for “exposed” and “non-exposed” firms
22In unreported results, which are available upon request, we check that our main message holds when
restricting the period to 2003-2004 or enlarging it to 2003-2006.
23If anything, this measurement error in the treatment variable will lead to attenuation bias, driving toward
zero the negative effect we find on survival and the positive effect on firm-level average wages and productivity.
Regarding firm-level employment growth, we may under-estimate the negative effect of minimum wages. We
will show that this is not the case by separating the firms with wages far from the future minimum wage
from other exposed firms: we find no significant employment repercussions amongst the strongly-exposed
firms for which attenuation bias is less likely.
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within cities and sectors (using city-sector fixed effects). This strategy helps to account for
the fact that cities with a favorable economic context might be less reluctant to increase
the minimum wage than other cities. Comparing exposed firms to other firms in the same
locality and industry will control for any local and sectoral level effects.
We further refine our identification strategy by addressing two potential remaining en-
dogeneity issues.
First, exposed firms might have particular characteristics which directly affect the change
in their economic performance. With our detailed firm-level data, we can control for initial
firm size (in terms of employment), productivity, average wages, exports, as well as firm
ownership (State-owned, Chinese private, foreign). These variables help to account for any
particular firm-level effects. In particular, controlling for initial performance allows us to
capture any potential firm convergence or divergence effects. Most previous work in this
area has relied on more aggregate data and so did not control for firm-level characteristics.
Second, local authorities may decide minimum-wage increases based on the (anticipated)
particular changes in low-wage firms, and not only the aggregate business cycle. To control
for the potential endogeneity of city-level minimum wages to low-wage firm performance
growth, we add an IV strategy to the fixed-effect estimation. The 2004 reform partly followed
a top-down logic, with the national government imposing constraints on local authorities
regarding their minimum wages. As long as national constraints were not designed to reflect
particular local conditions, we can use the institutional features of the reform to construct
our instruments. There are two variables which are natural candidates.
• First, the pre-reform city-level real minimum wage. One of the aims of the reform
was to help harmonize labor regulations across Chinese cities, and we have seen that
the dispersion in city-level minimum wages fell sharply after 2004; we thus expect a
negative relationship between the change in the city-level real minimum wage and its
2003 level.
• Second, the log difference between 0.4 times the 2005 city-level average wage and
the 2003 city-level minimum wage. The 2004 reform required the minimum wage to
fall between 40% and 60% of local average wages. The wider the gap between this
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lower bound and the initial city-level minimum wage, the greater the rise in the local
minimum wage. We thus expect a positive correlation between predicted growth (from
the lower bound imposed by the reform) and the actual rise in local real minimum
wages.
We check instrument validity by regressing the growth rate of city-level real minimum
wages between 2003 and 2005 on these two variables: this produces a negative estimated
coefficient on the initial minimum wage and a positive coefficient on the predicted growth rate
of local minimum wages (Table 1, column (1)). This continues to hold when we introduce
other city characteristics such as GDP per capita, population, FDI over GDP, and the ratio
of university student enrollment to population to control for any particular characteristics
in terms of city-level minimum wages (the results show that richer and more populated
cities have greater minimum-wage growth). However, when we run the same regression
for the 2001-2003 period, the results are notably different: the convergence across cities in
terms of minimum wages is much less noticeable, and the predictive power of the regressions
explaining city-level minimum wage growth is much lower. This confirms that the 2004
reform did indeed impose more constraints on cities with lower initial minimum wages.
For our instruments to be valid, they should not be correlated with business cycles which
specifically affect low-wage firms.24 Reassuringly, columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 suggest
that neither the city-level minimum wage nor predicted minimum-wage growth significantly
explain low-wage firm employment growth between 2003 and 2005. This again contrasts
with the results for 2001-2003 in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2. Here city-level minimum
wages and predicted minimum-wage growth both positively predict pre-reform employment
growth in low-wage firms. While this is not a formal test, these results suggest that we
cannot reject instrument exogeneity, which will be confirmed by the statistical tests during
our regression analysis.
We overall take these results as evidence that initial minimum wages and the log difference
between 0.4 times the 2005 city-level average wage and the 2003 city-level minimum wage
are good candidates for instrumenting city-level minimum wage growth.
24Since roughly 20% of the firms in our sample are “exposed”, having 2003 average wages below the 2005
minimum wage, we here consider as low-wage firms those in the first quintile of firms in terms of average
wage by city.
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Table 1: The determinants of city-level minimum wage growth
Dependent variable ∆ Ln real minimum wage
2003-05 2001-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln real Minimum wage -0.298a -0.489a -0.050c -0.096b
(0.040) (0.052) (0.026) (0.039)
Predicted minimum-wage growth 0.164a 0.089c 0.088a 0.058c
(0.047) (0.047) (0.029) (0.031)
Ln GDP per capita 0.064a 0.007
(0.015) (0.012)
Ln population 0.028b 0.027a
(0.011) (0.008)
FDI over GDP 0.025c -0.001
(0.015) (0.002)
Ratio of univ. students -0.001 0.001
to population (0.001) (0.001)
R-squared 0.34 0.40 0.06 0.11
Observations 261 261 258 258
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. a, b and
c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels. All right-
hand side variables are measured in 2003 in columns (1) and (2) and in 2001
in columns (3) and (4). Predicted minimum-wage growth is equal to the log
difference between 0.4 times the city-level average wage in 2005 (2003) and
the city-level minimum wage in 2003 (2001) in the first (last) two columns.
Table 2: The determinants of city-level employment growth in low-wage firms
Dependent variable ∆ Ln Employment (low-wage firms)
2003-05 2001-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Employment in low-wage firms -0.159a -0.195a -0.075b -0.077c
(0.033) (0.044) (0.037) (0.045)
Ln real Minimum wage 0.230 0.009 0.301c 0.313c
(0.182) (0.219) (0.172) (0.182)
Predicted minimum-wage growth 0.201 0.093 0.240c 0.242c
(0.142) (0.181) (0.133) (0.135)
Ln GDP per capita 0.102 -0.047
(0.068) (0.057)
Ln population 0.039 0.008
(0.044) (0.042)
FDI over GDP 0.107c 0.051c
(0.060) (0.028)
Ratio of univ. students -0.001 0.001
to population (0.001) (0.001)
R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.04 0.05
Observations 261 261 258 258
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. a, b and
c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels. All right-
hand side variables are measured in 2003 in columns (1) and (2) and in 2001
in columns (3) and (4). Predicted minimum-wage growth is equal to the
log difference between 0.4 times the city-level average wage in 2005 (2003)
and the city-level minimum wage in 2003 (2001) in the first two (last two)
columns.
20
We thus estimate a reduced-form equation relating the 2003-2005 change in firm-level
performance to the change in the real minimum wage over the same period in the firm’s
local area. The outcomes ∆Y f are in turn survival, and (for survivors) the change in average
wages, employment, productivity, profitability and output. Our key explanatory variable is
the 2003-2005 change in the real minimum wage in the city c where firm f is located,
interacted with a dummy identifying whether firm f is exposed. Our specification can be
written as follows:
∆Yf,c,k2003−05 = α∆ ln Minimum wage
c
2003−05 × Exposedf2003 + βZf2003 + µc,k + fc,k (1)
where ∆ denotes the 2003-2005 difference. As we exploit differences between exposed and
non-exposed firms within a given city-sector pair, we also include city-sector fixed effects, µc,k.
The sectors are defined following the Chinese sectoral classification at the 4-digit level. Our
final sample covers 480 sectors and 261 cities. Z is the set of firm-level controls including
proxies for initial firm-level performance, such as employment, productivity and average
wages (measured in 2003), as well as dummies for ownership type (State or foreign) and firm
export status. When estimating Equation (1), we instrument ∆ ln Minimum wagec2003−05 ×
Exposedf2003 by the interaction between the Exposed
f
2003 dummy and our two instruments
described above.
In this specification, α can be estimated using two sources of variation: the performance-
growth gap between exposed and non-exposed firms within city-sector pairs, and the real
minimum wage growth gap between cities. This strategy is similar to a triple difference:
we compare, for a given city-sector, the gap in performance growth between exposed and
non-exposed firms, and compare cities with higher and lower real minimum wage growth.
When we apply Equation (1) to aggregate outcomes, we appeal to the same estimation
strategy, but do not rely on interaction terms and directly instrument minimum-wage growth
via the city-level initial minimum wage and predicted minimum-wage growth (controlling for
initial city characteristics). We the compare cities where minimum wage grows fast to cities
where it grows more slowly.
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5 Firm-level results
We first analyze the effects of minimum wage growth on firm-level performance.
5.1 Baseline results
Table 3 shows the results from the estimation of Equation (1) with survival as the dependent
variable;25 the estimates corresponding to average wages, employment and labor productivity
are presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6 respectively.
All of the tables follow the same pattern. In column (1), we estimate Equation (1) without
the dyadic (city-sector) fixed effects but including sector dummies. This specification allows
us to gauge the association between local minimum wage growth and the change in firm-
level performance for both exposed and non-exposed firms, controlling for initial firm-level
characteristics. Column (2) includes city-sector fixed effects which pick up the main effect of
minimum wages in the city, leaving us with an estimated coefficient for the interaction with
the firm being exposed. Columns (3) and (4) show the two-stage least squares estimates
where the change in the real minimum wage is instrumented as described in the previous
section. We check that our instrumental variables are not weak and are valid. We report the
underidentification test and the F-test of excluded instruments in the first stage equation
to evaluate instrumental weakness. The Hansen J-statistic is also presented, which assesses
instrument exogeneity. All of these tests appear at the foot of the tables, and do not reject
instrument validity. In column (4) of each table, we check that our results are robust to
excluding observations from peripheral regions. The literature on China has emphasized
an interior-coast divide. Interior locations are significantly different from the rest of the
country: they have more inward-oriented economies and limited success in attracting foreign
investment. We check that our firm-level real minimum wage results are not driven by these
particular locations.
The results in Table 3 suggest that higher real minimum wages are detrimental to firm
survival. In column (1), bigger and more productive firms, and foreign and exporting firms,
are more likely to survive. Moreover, controlling for firm-level initial characteristics, the sur-
25We use here a linear probability model.
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vival probability of non-exposed firms is higher in cities where the minimum wage rose faster:
these OLS results are thus consistent with the local authorities being more likely to raise
the minimum wage in cities with more favorable local economic conditions. On the contrary,
exposed firms suffer from higher minimum wages: a 10% higher minimum wage reduces their
survival probability by 1.4 percentage points as compared to non-exposed firms. Introducing
city-sector fixed effects in column (2) does not affect this result, while instrumenting mini-
mum wage growth in column (3) makes the negative coefficient for exposed firms stronger;
this confirms that minimum-wage rises were larger in cities where low-wage firms benefited
from better shocks. Excluding peripheral regions does not change these results.
In our preferred specification, with city-sector fixed effects and IV estimation (column
3), a 10% minimum-wage rise between 2003 and 2005 reduces the probability of exposed-
firm survival by 2.1 percentage points. This effect is economically large, as the average
differential in the survival rate of exposed and non-exposed firms is only 12 percentage
points (see Table A-1), the elasticity of this differential to real minimum wage growth is thus
-1.75.26
The following tables focus on surviving firms. The results in Table 4 show that minimum-
wage increases lead to higher average wages in surviving firms. Theoretically, firms paying
their employees no more than the minimum wage should increase employee wages by the exact
same rate at which the local minimum wage increases. We would then expect an elasticity
of one. The expected elasticity would, by way of contrast, be less than one for firms which in
2003 paid average wages between the 2003 local minimum wage and that imposed in 2005.
The results in Table 4 are consistent with this latter scenario. The coefficient in our preferred
specification is 0.36, suggesting that 10% higher local minimum wages lead to a 3.6% rise in
the average wage paid by exposed firms. As such, the 2004 reform succeeded in significantly
increasing wages for workers in low-wage firms. This is a further proof that the 2004 reform
was binding and put wage pressure on low-wage firms.
We then investigate in Table 5 the possible repercussions of this non-negligible cost
shock on the number of employees in surviving firms. The results in column (1) show that
employment growth in non-exposed firms was significantly higher in cities with greater rises
26This elasticity can be computed as follows: − 0.21×0.10.12 × 10 = −1.75.
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Table 3: Minimum wages and firm survival
Dependent variable Survival of firm (2003-05)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator IV estimator
w/o periphery
∆ Ln Real Minimum wage 2003-05 0.076c
(0.045)
∆ Ln Real Minimum wage 2003-05 × Exposed -0.139a -0.136a -0.208a -0.216a
(0.038) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031)
Ln Firm employment 0.078a 0.081a 0.081a 0.081a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Ln Firm wage 0.031a 0.026a 0.020a 0.017a
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Ln Firm labor productivity 0.053a 0.053a 0.053a 0.053a
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
State dummy -0.120a -0.099a -0.099a -0.084a
(0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.027)
Foreign dummy 0.014b 0.027a 0.028a 0.030a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Export dummy 0.048a 0.028a 0.028a 0.030a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Sector Fixed effects Yes n.a. n.a. n.a.
City-Sector Fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
Observations 152,226 152,226 152,226 119,663
Underidentification test 63.7a 40.9a
First-stage F-test of excluded instruments 423a 443a
Overidentification Hansen J-statistic 0.09 0.52
Chi-sq(1) p-value 0.77 0.47
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the
city level. a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels. Survival is a
dummy for the 2003 firm still existing in the 2005 census. Exposed is a dummy for the average
wage in the firm in 2003 being lower than the local minimum wage in 2005. ∆ indicates the change
between 2003 and 2005. All other right-hand side variables are measured in 2003. The instruments
used in the IV procedure of ∆ Ln Minimum wage 2003-05 × Exposed in columns (3) and (4)
are the interactions of the local minimum wage in 2003 and the predicted minimum-wage change
based on the 40% rule (see text) with the exposed dummy. The underidentification test is based
on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic, with a indicating that the p-value (Chi-sq(2)) is below
0.01, suggesting that underidentification is rejected. The F-test of excluded instruments in the
first-stage equation is based on the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic, with a indicating that the
p-value is below 0.01, suggesting that the instruments are not weak. The F-statistic on the excluded
instruments is largely above 10, the informal threshold suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) to
assess instrument validity. The Hansen J-statistic is an overidentification test of all instruments,
a Chi-sq(1) p-value above 0.10 suggests that the model is overidentified and the instruments are
exogenous.
24
Table 4: Minimum wages and firm average wages
Dependent variable ∆ Ln Firm average wage (2003-05)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator IV estimator
w/o periphery
∆ Ln Real Minimum wage 2003-05 -0.436a
(0.104)
∆ Ln Real Minimum wage 2003-05 × Exposed 0.353a 0.262a 0.361a 0.410a
(0.104) (0.100) (0.114) (0.136)
Ln Firm employment 0.047a 0.052a 0.052a 0.050a
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ln Firm wage -0.696a -0.770a -0.762a -0.746a
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.037)
Ln Firm labor productivity 0.098a 0.093a 0.092a 0.094a
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
State dummy 0.027 0.062a 0.061a 0.076a
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.025)
Foreign dummy 0.173a 0.168a 0.167a 0.165a
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Export dummy 0.029a 0.017b 0.017b 0.018b
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Sector Fixed effects Yes n.a. n.a. n.a.
City-Sector Fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.45
Observations 112,171 112,171 112,171 90,714
Underidentification test 62.5a 41.0a
First-stage F-test of excluded instruments 414a 408a
Overidentification Hansen J-statistic 0.11 0.02
Chi-sq(1) p-value 0.73 0.89
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the
city level. a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels. Exposed
is a dummy for the average wage in the firm in 2003 being lower than the local minimum wage
in 2005. ∆ indicates the change between 2003 and 2005. All other right-hand side variables are
measured in 2003. The instruments used in the IV procedure of ∆ Ln Minimum wage 2003-05
× Exposed in columns (3) and (4) are the interactions of the local minimum wage in 2003 and
the predicted minimum-wage change based on the 40% rule (see text) with the exposed dummy.
The underidentification test is based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic, with a indicating
that the p-value (Chi-sq(2)) is below 0.01, suggesting that underidentification is rejected. The F-
test of excluded instruments in the first-stage equation is based on the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
F-statistic, with a indicating that the p-value is below 0.01, suggesting that the instruments are
not weak. The F-statistic on the excluded instruments is largely above 10, the informal threshold
suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) to assess instrument validity. The Hansen J-statistic is an
overidentification test of all instruments, a Chi-sq(1) p-value above 0.10 suggests that the model is
overidentified and the instruments are exogenous.
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in the minimum wage: this again confirms that local authorities are less reluctant to increase
minimum wages in cities facing better economic conditions. Regarding exposed firms, the
results are similar across the different columns. We find no significant job losses in the
exposed firms that remain active: the employment growth of surviving exposed firms is not
significantly different from the employment growth of surviving non-exposed firms. Exposed
firms do not then adjust to higher minimum wages by hiring less or firing more workers than
do other firms. Our results confirm, in the context of a developing country, the conclusions of
a number of papers showing no negative employment effects of minimum wages in developed
countries.
The results in Table 6 help us to understand the apparent paradox that higher minimum
wages bring about significantly higher per employee labor costs but do not harm employment
in surviving firms. We estimate Equation (1) using the log of average output per employee
as the outcome variable. As in the previous results, the various tests at the foot of the
table suggest that the IV procedure is valid and do not reject the null hypothesis that our
instruments are appropriate and not weak. The results in Table 6 show that higher real
minimum wages are associated with significant productivity gains for exposed firms. In our
preferred specification in column (3), a 1% rise in the minimum wage leads to 0.38% higher
productivity. Interestingly, this elasticity is very close to that of firm-level average wages to
real minimum wage growth (which was 0.36). For surviving firms, the cost shock brought
about by higher minimum wages seems to be exactly compensated by greater efficiency.
We examine in Table A-4 in the Appendix the repercussions of the 2004 minimum-
wage reform on other firm-level outcomes. Results for firm-level total factor productivity
calculated following the procedure proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) confirm the
above findings that firms exposed to higher minimum wages react with greater productivity.
Moreover, we have shown that labor-productivity gains fully match the higher wage costs
resulting from real minimum-wage growth. It consequently comes as no surprise that firm
profitability is not affected by higher minimum wages. Finally, real minimum-wage growth
leads to higher output for exposed firms, consistent with higher minimum wages generating
labor productivity gains without reducing employment amongst surviving firms. Note that
this result would certainly not hold in slow-growing economies. In fast-growing economies
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Table 5: Minimum wages and firm employment
Dependent variable ∆ Ln Firm employment (2003-05)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator IV estimator
w/o periphery
∆ Ln Real Minimum wage 2003-05 0.218a
(0.061)
∆ Ln Real Minimum wage 2003-05 × Exposed -0.029 -0.044 -0.045 -0.052
(0.043) (0.036) (0.042) (0.045)
Ln Firm employment -0.105a -0.120a -0.120a -0.120a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Ln Firm wage 0.066a 0.098a 0.097a 0.097a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Ln Firm labor productivity 0.106a 0.117a 0.117a 0.115a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
State dummy -0.055a -0.060a -0.060a -0.069a
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
Foreign dummy 0.014c 0.014c 0.014c 0.018b
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Export dummy 0.045a 0.047a 0.047a 0.045a
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Sector Fixed effects yes n.a. n.a. n.a.
City-Sector Fixed effects no yes yes yes
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12
Observations 112,171 112,171 112,171 90,714
Underidentification test 62.5a 41.1a
First-stage F-test of excluded instruments 428a 424a
Overidentification Hansen J-statistic 1.62 1.87
Chi-sq(1) p-value 0.20 0.17
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at
the city level. a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels. Exposed is a
dummy for the average wage in the firm in 2003 being lower than the local minimum wage in 2005.
∆ indicates the change between 2003 and 2005. All other right-hand side variables are measured in
2003. Instruments used in the IV procedure of ∆ Ln Minimum wage 2003-05 × Exposed in columns
(3) and (4) are the interactions of the local minimum wage in 2003 and the predicted minimum-
wage change based on the 40% rule (see text) with the exposed dummy. The underidentification test
is based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic, with a indicating that the p-value (Chi-sq(2)) is
below 0.01, suggesting that underidentification is rejected. The F-test of excluded instruments in the
first-stage equation is based on the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic, with a indicating that the
p-value is below 0.01, suggesting that the instruments are not weak. The F-statistic on the excluded
instruments is largely above 10, the informal threshold suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) to
assess instrument validity. The Hansen J-statistic is an overidentification test of all instruments,
a Chi-sq(1) p-value above 0.10 suggests that the model is overidentified and the instruments are
exogenous.
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Table 6: Minimum wages and firm productivity
Dependent variable ∆ Ln Firm labor productivity (2003-05)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator IV estimator
w/o periphery
∆ Ln Real Minimum wage 2003-05 -0.062
(0.066)
∆ Ln Real Minimum wage 2003-05 × Exposed 0.189a 0.280a 0.381a 0.387a
(0.059) (0.053) (0.056) (0.061)
Ln Firm employment 0.027a 0.031a 0.031a 0.036a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Ln Firm wage -0.094a -0.067a -0.059a -0.055a
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Ln Firm labor productivity -0.248a -0.286a -0.286a -0.273a
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
State dummy -0.232a -0.191a -0.191a -0.208a
(0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.035)
Foreign dummy 0.016 0.052a 0.051a 0.042a
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Export dummy -0.029a -0.020a -0.019a -0.017b
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Sector Fixed effects Yes n.a. n.a. n.a.
City-Sector Fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Observations 112,171 112,171 112,171 90,714
Underidentification test 62.5a 41.1a
First-stage F-test of excluded instruments 428a 423a
Overidentification Hansen J-statistic 1.72 0.37
Chi-sq(1) p-value 0.19 0.54
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at
the city level. a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels. Exposed is a
dummy for the average wage in the firm in 2003 being lower than the local minimum wage in 2005.
∆ indicates the change between 2003 and 2005. All other right-hand side variables are measured in
2003. Instruments used in the IV procedure of ∆ Ln Minimum wage 2003-05 × Exposed in columns
(3) and (4) are the interactions of the local minimum wage in 2003 and the predicted minimum-
wage change based on the 40% rule (see text) with the exposed dummy. The underidentification test
is based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic, with a indicating that the p-value (Chi-sq(2)) is
below 0.01 suggesting that underidentification is rejected. The F-test of excluded instruments in the
first-stage equation is based on the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic, with a indicating that the
p-value is below 0.01, suggesting that the instruments are not weak. The F-statistic on the excluded
instruments is largely above 10, the informal threshold suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) to
assess instrument validity. The Hansen J-statistic is an overidentification test of all instruments,
a Chi-sq(1) p-value above 0.10 suggests that the model is overidentified and the instruments are
exogenous.
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like China, the additional output from exposed firms via efficiency gains is easily absorbed
due to the growth in domestic and foreign demand.
Our results hence suggest that one important reason why minimum wages do not reduce
employment is the firm’s ability to increase productivity. However, we believe that the scope
for these productivity gains may be larger in China than in developed countries (Hsieh and
Klenow, 2009, Brandt et al., 2013). Higher wages could, for example, increase worker job
satisfaction and reduce labor-force turnover within firms, increasing overall productivity.27
The cost shock could also trigger the adoption of better management or organizational
practices which firms had not previously implemented due to their fixed adoption costs
(Bloom et al., 2013; Duflo et al., 2011). These mechanisms are probably more relevant in
developing countries, and the way in which firms react to higher minimum wages might
be very different in developed countries. For example, Draca et al. (2011) consider the
introduction of the minimum wage in UK and do not identify any significant productivity
effects. As in China, they do not find any significant negative effects on employment either:
firms seem to absorb higher labor costs through lower profits.
The effects we measure are economically large. Between 2003 and 2005, real minimum
wages rose by an average of 22% in China. Given the elasticities we measured, this brought
about a 7.9% rise in the average wages of exposed firms, and a 8.4% rise in their labor
productivity. Over this same period of time, average wages and productivity in exposed
firms rose by 92% and 46% respectively (cf. Table A-1).28 Thus, for exposed firms, the 2004
minimum-wage reform can explain about one-tenth and one-fifth of the average change in
wages and productivity respectively.29
Our results are robust to a number of robustness checks. In particular, in spite of the
introduction of city-sector fixed effects and our use of an IV strategy, we may still worry that
our results are partly explained by particular shocks affecting low-wage firms. These shocks
might be directly reflected in city-level GDP changes, or could be correlated with labor-force
skill composition. In Table A-5 in the Appendix, we thus add GDP growth and the share of
27The considerable rate of worker turnover in Chinese firms has been the subject of growing concern in
China over the past fifteen years (Bloom et al., 2013).
28For exposed firms, wages increase much faster than productivity. This is in line with Li et al. (2012),
who show that since the late 1990s the relative cost of labor has increased in China.
29The figures are 8.6% (0.22 × 0.361/0.92) and 18.2% (0.22 × 0.381/0.46).
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low-skilled workers in the total number of manufacturing workers in the city (measured in
2004, as information on the number of skilled and unskilled workers is only available in the
National Business Surveys for that year), both interacted with the exposure dummy.30 The
results barely change from a qualitative point of view.
In Table A-6 in the Appendix we also check that our results are robust to the introduction
of polynomials in the firm-level average wage. This test is inspired by a standard practice
in regression-discontinuity design frameworks (Lee and Lemieux, 2010) to ensure that the
coefficient on the treatment variable does not simply capture some non-linear relationship
between the dependent variable and the variable used to define the treatment. Following a
recent paper by Gelman and Imbens (2014), we limit ourselves to a quadratic polynomial in
firm-level average wage. The results remain qualitatively unchanged for all of the outcome
variables, confirming that the coefficient on the interaction between the exposed dummy and
real minimum-wage growth captures a real gap in performance growth between exposed and
non-exposed firms.
Finally, in unreported regressions, we verified that our results hold when introducing
the lag of the dependent variable as a regressor, to control further for specific trends in
performance growth at the firm-level.
5.2 Alternative explanations
We now investigate whether the absence of a negative employment effect and the positive
productivity effect of minimum-wage growth can be explained by alternative mechanisms.
In particular, firms might substitute migrants for local workers in order to absorb the
cost shock from higher minimum wages. It is well-known that migrant workers, who are
often illegal in the cities where they live, tend to work more hours, are paid less in terms
of hourly wages, and are less covered by welfare and fringe benefits (see Du and Pan, 2009
for example). As migrants are overall “cheaper” than local workers, firms can absorb the
cost shock by hiring more of them. If firms do not declare their (potentially illegal) migrant
workers in the National Business Surveys, due to the substitution effect, we should observe
30GDP growth and the share of unskilled workers in the manufacturing labor force are already taken into
account by the city-sector fixed effects.
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a negative effect of minimum wage growth on firm-level employment, which is inconsistent
with what we find. On the opposite, if firms do declare migrants in the National Business
Surveys, employment in exposed firms does not change relative to other firms, while the
composition of employment does. As migrants work more hours than do local workers, total
hours in exposed firms should rise as compared to non-exposed firms, which explains the
increase in labor productivity and output that we find.
We test for this second possibility by looking at the effect of minimum wage growth on
the fringe benefits (or welfare pay) that firms provide to their employees. With migrants
benefiting less from fringe benefits, the substitution of migrants for local workers post-2004
would lead to a relative fall in the share of welfare pay in total pay in exposed firms. Results
presented in Table A-7 in the Appendix show that this is absolutely not the case.
The analysis of the evolution of city-level unemployment and the ratio of migrants to
residents points in the same direction. If firms substitute migrants for local workers, we
should see a relative rise in unemployment and/or the number of migrants as compared to
residents in the overall population in cities with higher minimum-wage growth. Results in
Table A-8 in the Appendix show that this does not happen.
Finally, Du and Pan (2009) analyze two waves of China Urban Labor Surveys data
from 2001 and 2005, and show that all else equal (in particular controlling for age, skills
etc.) migrant workers are more likely to be paid less than the hourly minimum wage. This
probability gap in low pay between migrant and local workers was smaller in 2005 than in
2001, so that the “cost advantage” of migrant workers fell after the 2004 reform, which is in
line with the reform’s objective of improving migrant coverage in terms of labor standards.
Overall, these firm- and city-level results cast serious doubt on the hypothesis that ex-
posed firms substituted migrants for local workers in response to the reform’s higher mini-
mum wages.
Another concern relates to the number of hours worked by employees in exposed firms.
To absorb the cost shock of the 2004 reform, firms, and especially those that were the most
exposed to the minimum wage hike, might ask both their local and migrant workers to
increase their work hours. As we observe the number of employees, but not hours worked,
the lack of employment effects and the rise in productivity post-2004 could reflect longer
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work hours in exposed firms. We cannot directly test for this mechanism. However, Du and
Pan (2009) show that work hours fell between 2001 and 2005 in China for both migrants
and resident workers. In spite of falling work hours, firm-level output per worker rose by
an average of 23% over the 2003-2005 period in our data (46% for exposed firms, and 20%
for non-exposed firms, in both cases much faster than inflation). This could not have come
about without better firm-level organization or rising worker efficiency. In this context the
“number of hours” mechanism seems implausible.
5.3 Heterogeneous effects of minimum wage growth
We here go further in our understanding of the effects of the minimum wage by investigating
potential heterogeneity in a number of dimensions.
First, firms which use more unskilled labor should be more affected by minimum wages.
We have information on skills from the National Business Surveys for 2004 only. We cal-
culate the share of unskilled workers in the labor force for each city and sector. Results in
Table A-9 in the Appendix then show that the elasticity of firm-level average wage and labor
productivity growth to minimum-wage growth is higher in low-skill intensive city-sectors.
This is consistent with higher minimum wages putting more pressure on firms in city-sectors
which employ relatively more unskilled workers, as they are more likely to be paid low wages.
In the same vein, we noted above that probably not all workers in “exposed” firms will
actually be hit by the reform; the exposed firms in our sample are thus not equally affected
by the shock. We therefore split the sample of exposed firms by the difference between the
2005 city-level minimum wage and 2003 firm-level average wages: the larger this difference,
the more exposed the firms (due to a greater share of low-wage workers, or lower wages). The
results in Table A-10 in the Appendix show that the more exposed the firms, the more they
are affected by the reform. Note in particular that the results on the elasticity of firm-level
average wages to minimum wage growth underline a compression effect of minimum wages:
very low wages increase greatly and catch-up with low wages, so that wage dispersion in
the lower tail of the distribution falls. This is visible in Figure 3 which was discussed in
Section 4.1. This compression effect had already been noted by Katz and Krueger (1992)
and Lee (1999) in the US.
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Finally, one of the fears expressed by international employer federations regarding mini-
mum wages in developing countries is that foreign firms may be disproportionately hurt, as
local authorities are stricter with them. Results in Table A-11 in the Appendix show that
this is not the case, at least regarding survival and firm-level average wages. The elasticity of
firm-level productivity to minimum wages seems to be lower for foreign firms, consistent with
there being less inefficiency in these firms. Regarding employment, the results even suggest
that foreign firms benefit from minimum-wage growth (which can theoretically occur under
efficiency wages, for example).
In unreported results, we also checked for a non-linear effect of minimum-wage growth.
We detected no such patterns: the marginal effect of minimum wage growth was similar for
large and small rises in the real minimum wage.
6 Aggregate results
We have so far investigated the effect of minimum wages on firm-level behavior. We would
now like to know how these micro-effects add up to aggregate outcomes. In particular, does
the fact that minimum-wage growth forces some firms to exit the market reduce overall
employment? How do within-firm productivity gains and firm-level entry and exit translate
into aggregate productivity? We investigate by first looking at the effect of 2004 minimum
wage growth on city-level employment growth. In a second step, we repeat the analysis for
city-level productivity growth. In both cases, we decompose the overall movement into its
different components (within-firm movements, entry, exit, and reallocations).
Our aggregate analysis relies on the same two instruments (initial minimum wage and
predicted minimum-wage growth based on the 40% rule) as the firm-level analysis.
6.1 Minimum wages and city-level employment growth
We analyze city-level employment growth between 2003 and 2005. For each city and year,
city-level employment is the sum of firm employment. All regressions control for the ini-
tial level of employment as well as GDP per capita, population, the FDI to GDP ratio,
and university-student enrollment. We thus control for potential convergence or divergence
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factors and differences across cities in terms of size, wealth and attractiveness.
The results for the 2003-2005 city-level employment change appear in columns (1) and
(2) of Table 7 for the OLS and IV estimators respectively. The IV results suggest that
higher minimum wages have no significant employment effects.31 In line with intuition, the
comparison between the OLS and IV regressions suggests that minimum-wage rises were
larger in cities experiencing favorable economic shocks. Instrumentation clearly reduces the
coefficient on minimum wage growth, which is now insignificant. It is thus important to
control for endogeneity by instrumenting minimum wage growth.
While higher minimum wages were associated with lower survival probability in the firm-
level results, there is no effect on aggregate manufacturing employment in the city-level
results. A decomposition of city-level employment growth into job creation, job destruction
and employment growth in incumbent firms can help us understand this opposition. The
remaining columns of Table 7 list the IV results for the various components of city-level
employment growth: job losses from exiting firms (column (3)), the within component given
by the change in employment among surviving firms (column (4)), and the total number of
jobs created by firms entering the market between 2003 and 2005 (column (5)).
The results in column (4) confirm the absence of any employment effect among surviving
firms at the firm-level in Table 5. Although only significant at the 10% level, the results
in columns (3) and (5) suggest that higher minimum wages are associated with more job
destruction, consistent with the negative effect on firm survival, but also more job creation.
The point estimates on minimum-wage growth for job creation and destruction turn out to
be very similar, at 0.6 and 0.7 respectively. Overall, these results explain why minimum
wages do not reduce aggregate employment. All else equal, higher minimum wages lead to
creative destruction within cities, so that their overall effect on employment is zero. However,
note that the absence of a city-level employment effect of minimum wage growth should be
taken with caution. The business surveys we use cover 70% of industrial workers: if the
industrial firms that do not appear in the surveys and service firms react differently to real
minimum-wage growth, then our conclusions may change.32
31The various tests reported at the bottom of the table do not reject the validity of our IV strategy.
32In unreported results (available upon request), we further decompose the job losses due to exiting firms
into the number of exiting firms and their average employment, and the job creation due to new firms
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Table 7: Minimum wages and the components of city-level employment growth
Explained component ∆ Ln Employment city-level (2003-2005)
Estimator OLS IV IV
Firms All Exiting Surviving Entry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ Real minimum wage 2003-05 0.629a 0.162 0.543c -0.051 0.656c
(0.157) (0.209) (0.328) (0.084) (0.366)
Ln Labor productivity -0.193c -0.191c 0.008 0.048 -0.342b
(0.098) (0.100) (0.115) (0.033) (0.154)
Ln Number of firms -0.169 -0.162 1.055a 0.032b 0.378a
(0.105) (0.106) (0.066) (0.015) (0.072)
Ln Average size of firms 0.418 0.569 0.904a 0.004 0.269b
(0.881) (0.905) (0.133) (0.025) (0.135)
Ln GDP per capita 0.337a 0.326a -0.154c -0.028 0.543a
(0.074) (0.074) (0.084) (0.023) (0.114)
Ln Population 0.181a 0.166a -0.040 -0.006 0.270a
(0.044) (0.045) (0.072) (0.013) (0.071)
FDI over GDP 0.087c 0.068 -0.136b 0.061a -0.011
(0.046) (0.047) (0.063) (0.022) (0.083)
Ratio of univ. students -0.0002b -0.0002b 0.0002c -0.0002a -0.0001
to population (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
R-squared 0.39 0.36 0.79 0.13 0.60
Observations 261 261 261 261
Underidentification test 44.2a 40.0a 40.0a 40.0a
First-stage F-test 84.2a 84.7a 84.7a 84.7a
Overid. Hansen J-stat 1.72 0.12 0.09 1.38
Chi-sq(1) p-value 0.19 0.74 0.76 0.24
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the city level. a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence
levels. ∆ indicates the change between 2003 and 2005. All other right-hand side variables
are measured in 2003. Instruments used in the IV procedure of ∆ Ln Minimum wage 2003-
05 are the local minimum wage in 2003 and the predicted minimum-wage change based
on the 40% rule (see text). The underidentification test is based on the Kleibergen-Paap
rk LM-statistic, with a indicating that the p-value (Chi-sq(2)) is below 0.01, suggesting
that underidentification is rejected. The F-test of excluded instruments in the first stage
equation is based on the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic, with a indicating that the
p-value is below 0.01, suggesting that the instruments are not weak. The F-statistic on the
excluded instruments is largely above 10, the informal threshold suggested by Staiger and
Stock (1997) to assess instrument validity. The Hansen J-statistic is an overidentification
test of all instruments, a Chi-sq(1) p-value above 0.10 suggests that the model is overidenti-
fied and the instruments are exogenous. For definitions of the various margins (from exiting,
surviving and entry firms) see the main text in Section 6.1.
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The next subsection considers the effect of the 2004 reform on city-level productivity
growth. Sample representativeness is less of a concern here since the surveys cover 90% of
total industrial output.
6.2 Minimum wages and aggregate productivity: a decomposition
analysis
Our estimates of the effect of minimum wages on city-level productivity growth follow Foster
et al. (2001). As summarized in the equation below, we decompose the city-level change
in aggregate labor productivity using three categories of firms, Survivors, Exiters and
Entrants:
∆yc2003−05 =
∑
f ∈ Survivorsc
θf2003∆y
f
2003−05︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within
(2)
+
∑
f ∈ Survivorsc
∆θf2003−05 × [yf2003 − yc2003]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Between
+
∑
f∈ Survivorsc
∆θf2003−05 ×∆yf2003−05︸ ︷︷ ︸
Covariance
+
∑
f ∈ Entrantsc
θf2005 × [yf2005 − yc2003]−
∑
f ∈ Exitersc
θf2003 × [yf2003 − yc2003]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net entry
Average labor productivity in city c in 2003, yc2003, is given by the weighted average of
the labor productivity yf2003 of firms f located in city c (in log), with the weights θ
f
2003 being
the share of firm f in total employment in city c. The first three components in Equation 2
are calculated over the population of surviving firms. The first term is the within component,
i.e. the productivity growth of surviving firms between 2003 and 2005, keeping their shares
into the number of newly-created firms and their average size. The coefficient on minimum-wage growth is
insignificant, except for the number of newly-created firms (where it is positive and significant at the 10%
level).
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constant. The second term is the between component, which accounts for the reallocation
of labor between firms with different initial productivities. A positive change here reflects a
reallocation of labor from initially less-efficient to initially more-efficient firms (as compared
to the city-level average). The third term is the covariance between the within-firm and
between-firm changes. A positive value here shows that expanding firms are those which
report greater productivity gains. The last two terms refer to entrants and exiters. These
show how productivity in these two groups compares to the city-level average. A positive
value for the entry (exit) term reflects that new entrants (exiters) are systematically more
efficient than the average local firm in 2003.
Table 8 shows the IV results for these five terms. We again control for a number of
proxies for initial city size, wealth, productivity and attractiveness. The results confirm that
cities in which the minimum wage rose faster experienced the greatest productivity gains.
The results in column 1 suggest that a 1% difference in minimum-wage growth leads
to a 0.36% gap in productivity. As shown in columns (3) and (5), aggregate productivity
growth mainly comes from two channels: higher within-firm efficiency among survivors and
net entry. The first channel is consistent with the firm-level results. The latter is suggestive
of a cleansing effect of minimum wage: the cost shock from higher real minimum wages
forces less-productive firms to exit and new entrants to be more productive than average.
However, minimum-wage growth does not seem to affect the allocation of employment across
incumbent firms: neither the between nor the covariance terms are significantly related to
city-level real minimum-wage growth.
Again, the effects we measure are economically large. The elasticity of aggregate produc-
tivity to minimum wage growth being equal to 0.356, the average 2003-2005 rise in minimum
wages of 21.9% produced a 7.8 percentage point increase in aggregate productivity. City-
level labor productivity rose by an average of 35% over the period, so that the contribution of
minimum wages to aggregate productivity growth is 22.2%. Of the four different log additive
margins in Equation 2, the decomposition analysis in Table 8 shows that both the within
and the net entry margins contribute positively and significantly to the effect of minimum
wages on productivity growth. The other two (between and covariance) exhibit negative
but insignificant correlations. The overall positive effect of minimum wages on productivity
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Table 8: Minimum wages and the components of city-level labor productivity growth
Estimator IV
Dependent component Total Within Between Covariance Net entry Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ Real Minimum wage 2003-05 0.356b 0.218c -0.098 -0.063 0.299b 0.184 -0.116c
(0.168) (0.132) (0.066) (0.110) (0.141) (0.129) (0.060)
Ln Labor productivity -0.177b -0.086 -0.067 0.097 -0.120 -0.191a -0.071b
(0.081) (0.070) (0.042) (0.065) (0.080) (0.067) (0.030)
Ln Employment -0.030 -0.046 0.010 0.068c -0.062b -0.046 0.016c
(0.043) (0.038) (0.019) (0.035) (0.028) (0.029) (0.009)
Ln GDP per capita 0.057 0.056 0.022 -0.083c 0.062 0.083c 0.021
(0.058) (0.051) (0.027) (0.044) (0.048) (0.045) (0.016)
Ln Population 0.044 0.015 0.008 -0.034c 0.055b 0.041c -0.014
(0.032) (0.025) (0.011) (0.019) (0.024) (0.022) (0.009)
FDI over GDP -0.047 -0.030 0.015 -0.004 -0.027 -0.012 0.015c
(0.036) (0.025) (0.012) (0.019) (0.029) (0.028) (0.008)
Ratio of univ. students 0.0001a 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.0001a 0.0001a -0.0001b
to population (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.14
Observations 261 261 261 261 261 261 261
Underidentification test 43.8a 43.8a 43.8a 43.8a 43.8a 43.8a 43.8a
First-stage F-test 81.8a 81.8a 81.8a 81.8a 81.8a 81.8a 81.8a
Overid. Hansen J-stat 0.26 1.02 0.01 0.01 1.65 2.32 0.12
Chi-sq(1) p-value 0.61 0.31 0.92 0.98 0.20 0.13 0.73
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the city level.
a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels. ∆ indicates the change between 2003
and 2005. All other right-hand side variables are measured in 2003. Instruments used in the IV procedure of ∆
Ln Minimum wage 2003-05 are the local minimum wage in 2003 and the predicted minimum-wage change based
on the 40% rule (see text). The underidentification test is based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic, with a
indicating that the p-value (Chi-sq(2)) is below 0.01, suggesting that underidentification is rejected. The F-test
of excluded instruments in the first-stage equation is based on the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic, with a
indicating that the p-value is below 0.01, suggesting that the instruments are not weak. The F-statistic on the
excluded instruments is largely above 10, the informal threshold suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) to assess
instrument validity. The Hansen J-statistic is an overidentification test of all instruments, a Chi-sq(1) p-value
above 0.10 suggests that the model is overidentified and the instruments are exogenous. For definitions of the
various margins (within, between, covariance, entry, exit) see Section 6.2.
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then comes entirely from the within and net-entry terms. As the elasticity of the latter is
50% larger than that of the former (0.299 versus 0.218), their respective contributions to the
effect of minimum wage on aggregate productivity growth are 40% and 60%.
7 Conclusion
This paper has shown that higher minimum wages might be one way for developing countries
to increase the wages of low-paid workers without necessarily harming their economy. We
consider the shock of the 2004 minimum-wage reform in China to evaluate the repercussions
of minimum-wage growth on firm survival, employment, productivity and profitability. We
identify the causal effect of minimum wage growth via a triple-difference estimator combined
with an IV strategy based on the institutional features of the 2004 reform. We find that, at
the firm-level, firm survival fell, wages rose and labor productivity significantly increased,
allowing surviving firms to maintain their employment and profits. Moreover, we show that
higher minimum wages boosted city-level aggregate productivity via efficiency improvements
among incumbent firms and the net entry of more productive firms. Hence, in a fast-growing
economy like China where there is considerable inefficiency, minimum wages might have a
cleansing effect and represent one way of boosting aggregate productivity.
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Appendix
Table A-1: Summary statistics on exposure and wage evolution
Firm type Exposed Non-exposed
Number present in our sample in 2003 35,659 131,668
of which alive in 2005 23,356 102,423
Survival rate 0.66 0.78
Surviving firms
Mean ∆ ln wage2003−05 0.92 0.13
Median ∆ ln wage2003−05 0.73 0.13
s.d. ∆ ln wage2003−05 0.84 0.50
Mean ∆ ln labor productivity2003−05 0.46 0.20
s.d. ∆ ln labor productivity2003−05 0.20 0.65
Mean ∆ ln employment2003−05 0 0.01
s.d. ∆ ln employment2003−05 0.62 0.51
All firms
Mean ∆ ln Minimum wage2003−05 0.26 0.24
s.d. ∆ ln Minimum wage2003−05 0.11 0.10
Mean ∆ ln Real Minimum wage2003−05 0.20 0.19
s.d. ∆ ln Real Minimum wage2003−05 0.11 0.09
Authors’ calculations from the 2003 and 2005 NBS annual surveys.
Real minimum wages are calculated using provincial price indices.
See the main text for details.
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Table A-2: Determinants of firm-level exposure to minimum wage changes (2003-05)
Dependent variable Firm exposure dummy
(1) (2) (3)
Sample w/o outlier
Ln Firm employment -0.023a 0.030a -0.024a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Ln Firm labor productivity -0.086a -0.081a
(0.006) (0.006)
Ln Firm TFP -0.070a
(0.005)
Firm profit over output 0.002a 0.002a 0.002a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
State dummy -0.014 -0.004 -0.016
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Foreign dummy -0.045a -0.055a -0.046a
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Export dummy -0.037a -0.043a -0.036a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
City-Sector Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.05 0.04 0.04
Observations 167,327 164,927 163,738
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors appear in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the city level. a, b and c indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels. Exposure is
a dummy for the average wage in the firm in 2003 being lower than
the local minimum wage in 2005. All other right-hand side variables
are measured in 2003. Firm-level productivity is measured either
as labor productivity (output per employee) or as TFP (based on
the Levinsohn-Petrin approach). Column 3 excludes the top and
bottom percentiles of average wages in 2003. See the main text for
details.
Table A-3: Distribution of the firm-level average wage to city-level minimum wage ratio in
%
All firms Foreign firms
2001 2003 2005 2001 2003 2005
Share of firms with Average wage
City minimum wage
<1 12.4 10.3 6.3 7.3 6.4 4.5
Share of firms with 1≤ Average wage
City minimum wage
≤1.15 5.2 4.5 5.7 3.5 3.0 3.6
State-owned firms Domestic private firms
2001 2003 2005 2001 2003 2005
Share of firms with Average wage
City minimum wage
<1 21.0 17.8 6.7 12.2 10.8 6.7
Share of firms with 1≤ Average wage
City minimum wage
≤1.15 6.0 5.2 5.6 5.6 4.9 6.4
Authors’ calculations from the 2001, 2003 and 2005 NBS annual surveys. See the main text for
details.
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Table A-4: Minimum wages and other firm-level outcomes
Dependent variable ∆ Firm outcome (2003-05)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm outcome Ln TFP profit over output Ln output
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
∆ Ln Real Minimum wage 2003-05 × Exposed 0.329a 0.488a 0.114 0.157 0.236a 0.336a
(0.085) (0.100) (0.096) (0.135) (0.055) (0.054)
Ln Firm employment 0.188a 0.189a 0.006c 0.006c -0.089a -0.089a
(0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Ln Firm wage 0.111a 0.125a 0.019 0.023 0.030b 0.039a
(0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012)
Ln Firm TFP -0.435a -0.436a
(0.013) (0.013)
Ln Firm labor productivity 0.030b 0.030b -0.169a -0.169a
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Firm profit over output -0.849a -0.849a
(0.131) (0.131)
State dummy -0.336a -0.337a -0.311 -0.311 -0.251a -0.251a
(0.024) (0.024) (0.208) (0.208) (0.022) (0.022)
Foreign dummy 0.077a 0.076a 0.023 0.022 0.065a 0.065a
(0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013)
Export dummy 0.017c 0.017c 0.015 0.015 0.027a 0.027a
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010)
City-Sector Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05
Observations 110,556 112,171 112,171
Underidentification test 62.6a 62.5a 62.5a
First-stage F-test of excluded instruments 431a 428a 428a
Overidentification Hansen J-statistic 0.19 0.30 0.06
Chi-sq(1) p-value 0.66 0.58 0.81
Labor productivity is calculated as output value per employee. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
appear in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. a, b and c indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels. Exposed is a dummy for the average wage in the firm in 2003 being lower
than the local minimum wage in 2005. ∆ indicates the change between 2003 and 2005. All other right-hand
side variables are measured in 2003. Instruments used in the IV procedure of ∆ Ln Minimum wage 2003-05 ×
Exposed in columns (2), (4) and (6) are the interactions of the local minimum wage in 2003 and the predicted
minimum-wage change based on the 40% rule (see text) with the exposed dummy. The underidentification
test is based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic, with a indicating that the p-value (Chi-sq(2)) is below
0.01, suggesting that underidentification is rejected. The F-test of excluded instruments in the first stage
equation is based on the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic, with a indicating that the p-value is below
0.01, suggesting that the instruments are not weak. The F-statistic on the excluded instruments is largely
above 10, the informal threshold suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) to assess instrument validity. The
Hansen J-statistic is an overidentification test of all instruments, a Chi-sq(1) p-value above 0.10 suggests
that the model is overidentified and the instruments are exogenous.
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Table A-7: Alternative explanations: minimum wages, average wages and welfare pay
Dependent variable ∆ Firm outcome (2003-05)
Estimator IV estimator
Outcome Per employee
Ln Total pay Share of welfare
(wage+welfare) pay over total pay
(1) (2)
∆ Ln Real Minimum wage 2003-05 × Exposed 0.372a -0.006
(0.113) (0.005)
Ln Firm employment 0.054a 0.003a
(0.004) (0.001)
Ln Firm average total pay -0.749a 0.005a
(0.032) (0.001)
Share of welfare pay over total pay -0.857a
(0.014)
Ln Firm labor productivity 0.095a 0.004a
(0.006) (0.001)
State dummy 0.065a 0.005a
(0.019) (0.002)
Foreign dummy 0.144a -0.022a
(0.020) (0.002)
Export dummy 0.017b 0.001
(0.007) (0.001)
City-Sector Fixed effects Yes Yes
R-squared 0.45 0.48
Observations 112,171 112,171
Underidentification test 62.0a 62.4a
First-stage F-test of excluded instruments 415a 428a
Overidentification Hansen J-statistic 0.06 0.66
Chi-sq(1) p-value 0.81 0.42
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the city level. a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence
levels. Exposed is a dummy for the average wage in the firm in 2003 being lower than the
local minimum wage in 2005. ∆ indicates the change between 2003 and 2005. All other
right-hand side variables are measured in 2003. Instruments used in the IV procedure of
∆ Ln Minimum wage 2003-05 × Exposed in columns (3) and (4) are the interactions of
the local minimum wage in 2003 and the predicted minimum-wage change based on the
40% rule (see text) with the exposed dummy. The underidentification test is based on the
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic, with a indicating that the p-value (Chi-sq(2)) is below
0.01, suggesting that underidentification is rejected. The F-test of excluded instruments in
the first-stage equation is based on the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic, with a indi-
cating that the p-value is below 0.01, suggesting that the instruments are not weak. The
F-statistic on the excluded instruments is largely above 10, the informal threshold suggested
by Staiger and Stock (1997) to assess instrument validity. The Hansen J-statistic is an overi-
dentification test of all instruments, a Chi-sq(1) p-value above 0.10 suggests that the model
is overidentified and the instruments are exogenous.
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Table A-8: Alternative explanations: City-level unemployment and the share of migrants
Dependent variable ∆ City-level outcome
Outcome variable Unemployment rate Ratio migrants/residents 2000-05
2003-05 Total Working age
population population
Estimator OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Real Minimum wage 2003-05 -0.003 0.005 0.069 -0.019 0.105 -0.018
(0.002) (0.003) (0.065) (0.066) (0.090) (0.086)
Ln Employment -0.001 -0.001 0.041c 0.042c 0.055c 0.057c
(0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029) (0.029)
Unemployment rate -0.709a -0.707a
(0.167) (0.168)
Ratio of migrants (total) -0.541a -0.543a
(0.186) (0.184)
Ratio of migrants (working age) -0.415b -0.417b
(0.185) (0.183)
Ln GDP per capita 0.003a 0.003a 0.090a 0.089a 0.058 0.057
(0.001) (0.001) (0.033) (0.032) (0.041) (0.041)
Ln Population -0.001 0.001 0.026 0.023 0.021 0.017
(0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.023) (0.030) (0.029)
FDI over GDP -0.001 0.001 0.094b 0.090b 0.124b 0.118b
(0.001) (0.001) (0.046) (0.045) (0.054) (0.053)
Ratio of univ. students 0.001c 0.001c -0.001b -0.001a -0.001b -0.001b
to population (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-squared 0.70 0.69 0.53 0.53 0.39 0.39
Observations 261 261
Underidentification test 41.9a 42.1a 42.2a
First-stage F-test of 86.3a 80.4a 80.4a
excluded instruments
Overid. Hansen J-stat 0.86 0.88 0.03
Chi-sq(1) p-value 0.36 0.35 0.87
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered
at the city level. a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels. ∆
indicates the change between 2003 and 2005. All other right-hand side variables are measured
in 2003. Instruments used in the IV procedure of ∆ Ln Minimum wage 2003-05 in columns
(2), (4) and (6) are the local minimum wage in 2003 and the predicted minimum-wage change
based on the 40% rule (see text). The underidentification test is based on the Kleibergen-Paap
rk LM-statistic, with a indicating that the p-value (Chi-sq(2)) is below 0.01, suggesting that
underidentification is rejected. The F-test of excluded instruments in the first-stage equation is
based on the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic, with a indicating that the p-value is below
0.01, suggesting that the instruments are not weak. The F-statistic on the excluded instruments
is largely above 10, the informal threshold suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) to assess instru-
ment validity.The Hansen J-statistic is an overidentification test of all instruments, a Chi-sq(1)
p-value above 0.10 suggests that the model is overidentified and the instruments are exogenous.
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Figure A-1: Monthly minimum wages in 2003 (Yuan)
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Figure A-2: ∆ Monthly minimum wages 2003-05
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Figure A-3: ∆ Monthly real minimum wages 2003-05
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